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BY ITS FRUITS SHALL YE KNOW; AXSON-FLYNN V. JOHNSON:
MORE ROTTED FRUIT FROM EMPLOYMENT DIVISION V SMITH
BRADLEY C. JOHNSON*
Vice is a monster of so frightful mien,
As, to be hated, needs but to be seen;
Yet seen too oft, familiar with her face,
We first endure, then pity, then embrace.1
INTRODUCTION
When the French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville came to the United
States in 1831, he declared that there was "no country in the world
where... religion retains a greater influence over the souls of men."' 2 Al-
though religion's influence in America has undoubtedly declined since de
Tocqueville's visit, the United States can still rightly be characterized as a
religious nation. A substantial majority of Americans believe in God,3 at-
tend a church,4 and feel that religion is an important part of their lives.
5
It is not surprising then, that when Employment Division v. Smith6 was
decided, the shockwaves of the decision traveled quickly throughout reli-
gious communities. To many, the Supreme Court's decision in Smith gutted
the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause of any meaningful protec-
tion. 7 Immediately, a broad-based coalition of religious and civil liberties
* J.D. Candidate 2005, Chicago-Kent College of Law; B.A., Political Science, Brigham Young
University, 2000. My thanks to the Honor Scholars and Law Review staff for their helpful comments
and to Michelle, Josiah, and Caleb Johnson for their patience in giving up important time for less
important matters.
1. ALEXANDER POPE, THE POEMS OF ALEXANDER POPE 523 11. 216-20 (John Butt ed., 1963).
2. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 314 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage
Books 1945) (1835).
3. 95% of Americans state that they believe in God. George H. Gallup, Jr., Gallup Index of
Leading Religious Indicators, GALLUP ORG., Feb. 12, 2002, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/con-
tent?ci=5317.
4. 59% of Americans attend church at least once a month, with 44% attending almost every
week. Only 14% of Americans reportedly never attend church. Frank Newport, Update: Americans and
Religion, GALLUP ORG., Dec. 23, 2004, at http://www.gallupcom/poll/content/default.aspx?ci
= 14446.
5. 83% of Americans report that religion plays an important part of their life, with 59% stating it
plays a very important part, and 24% stating it plays a fairly important part. Id.
6. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7. See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic
Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1409 n.15 (1992) (citing numerous law review articles and notes that
have condemned Smith for its effect on the free exercise area).
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groups from both the left and right political spectrums joined a petition for
the Court to rehear the matter,8 which the Court subsequently denied. 9
Congress also responded to Smith by passing the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act ("RFRA"), which sought to restore the pre-Smith free exercise
standard. 10 Both houses of Congress overwhelmingly passed RFRA and
President Clinton signed it into law; however, the Supreme Court subse-
quently struck down RFRA as unconstitutional when applied to the states.11
Although most legal scholars agreed that the Supreme Court's method
of reaching the result in Smith was unsound, legal scholars fiercely debated
whether Smith was an appropriate way to interpret the Free Exercise
Clause. 12 Criticisms of Smith abounded in the aftermath of the decision,
13
but as time went on and the Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of
Smith,14 legal commentary shifted its focus from criticizing Smith to ana-
lyzing the best way to salvage what little free exercise protection was left
after Smith. 15
Fifteen years have now passed since Smith changed the free exercise
landscape. This Note is not another attempt to criticize the Smith opinion's
reasoning or subterfuge in reaching its result but is an attempt to criticize
Smith by looking at one adverse consequence that has resulted from the
decision. That consequence confirms that the most devastating aspect of the
Smith decision was not its tortured twisting of precedent but its surrender-
8. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1109, 1111 (1990).
9. Employment Div. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 913 (1990).
10. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488. The RFRA
mandated that the government could not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion unless it
was in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and it was the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2000).
11. The Court found that the Act exceeded Congress' section 5 authority of the 14th Amendment.
City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
12. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75
IND. L.J. 77, 80 n.9 (2000) (listing representative examples of articles criticizing Smith and articles
defending Smith's result).
13. E.g., James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91 (1991);
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Steven D. Smith, The Rise
and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV- 149 (1991).
14. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993)
(reaffirming Smith).
15. See Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging
Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275 (examining emerging trend of state courts to use
state constitutions to protect free exercise); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exer-
cise Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 925 (2000) (arguing that the religious exemption doctrine is no
longer tenable and scholars should construct a more defensible doctrine that would take into account the
diminished place of religion in society); Robert W. Turtle, How Firm a Foundation? Protecting Reli-
gious Land Use After Boeme, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861 (2000) (examining Congress' latest attempt
to ameliorate the effects of Smith).
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ing the primary protection of free exercise rights to the political process.
Although early critics of Smith could only postulate as to what conse-
quences might flow from the decision, 16 fifteen years later, one concrete
adverse consequence from Smith has now been revealed.
That adverse consequence is seen in the Tenth Circuit case Axson-
Flynn v. Johnson, in which a drama student at a state university refused to
say certain swear words because of her religious beliefs. 17 The issue before
the Tenth Circuit was whether the Free Exercise Clause after Smith could
protect the plaintiff from having to choose between leaving the university
program on the one hand, and staying, but being compelled to swear on the
other. 18 Although the Tenth Circuit avoided having to affirm the district
court's holding that the university could require Axson-Flynn to swear, the
Tenth Circuit's opinion was clear that the Smith Free Exercise Clause
would allow for such a result.19
Axson-Flynn provides a nice vehicle to critique the Smith decision be-
cause it affirms the initial criticisms of Smith that the decision left little
protection, if any, for free exercise rights. 20 Axson-Flynn shows that Smith
has resulted in the adverse consequence that a state may constitutionally
compel 2' an individual to swear in violation of his or her 22 religious
beliefs.
16. See Kenneth Main, Note, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Alters the State
of Free Exercise Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1431, 1474 (1991) (looking at implications of the Smith
decision for religious individuals).
17. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1280 (10th Cir. 2004).
18. Id. at 1293.
19. Id. at 1294.
20. See supra note 13.
21. Some people may object to the Note's characterization that a state could ever "compel" some-
one to swear. Webster's College Dictionary defines the word "compel" as "to force or drive, esp. to a
course of action." RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 276 (1995). This definition is
broad enough to include other kinds of force besides physical force alone, such as withholding of
benefits or punishment. In Axson-Flynn's case, if she did not agree to swear, she would not be allowed
to complete the program. If she wished to receive the state benefit of the University's acting program,
she had little choice but to swear. In this way she was compelled to swear. Of course, Axson-Flynn
could, and in fact did, drop out of the program, and thus avoid swearing. Because Axson-Flynn had the
choice to drop out of the program, it is a tougher ease to say that by denying Axson-Flynn the opportu-
nity to be part of the drama program, the state was compelling her to swear. However, clearly a resource
denial can sometimes be considered a compelling force if the denial involves an important state re-
source. For example, if a state denies a needy individual his welfare benefits if he does not do certain
things, one can validly say that the state is driving him to a certain course of action. To Axson-Flynn,
denying her the opportunity to be a part of the University's program unless she agreed to swear was no
small denial. Axson-Flynn wanted to be a career actress and the University of Utah had a well-respected
acting program that would significantly help her obtain her desired career. Moreover, because the
program was subsidized through the state, the program was more affordable as well as close to home.
When Axson-Flynn chose not to swear and leave the program, she had to drop out of the prominent
program, lose the money she had paid and the time she had invested, and join another program that was
more inconvenient and less-respected. These burdens were by no means trivial, and, taken together,
20051
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Of course, the result that a state may compel someone to swear is only
a critique of Smith if two things are true: (1) the consequence of compelling
someone to swear against her religious beliefs is undesirable, and (2) Smith
actually allows that consequence to happen. This Note will focus primarily
on showing that the second assertion is true but will briefly address the first
assertion, that allowing compelled swearing is undesirable, now.
Admittedly, it is not obvious to everyone that allowing a state to com-
pel someone to swear constitutes much of a critique against Smith, and
some individuals might not find the result of compelled swearing patently
undesirable. In today's society, where swearing has become commonplace
and uneventful, many might not be bothered by requiring someone to
swear. One might think that if swearing is harmless, then requiring some-
one to swear in a drama class is not something society needs to be overly
concerned with. A candid person may in fact be tempted to tell the plaintiff
in Axson-Flynn to step out of her sheltered world and join the grown ups.
Paradoxically, this type of thinking reveals this Note's criticism of
Smith and why Axson-Flynn is a good case to make that criticism: Smith's
Free Exercise Clause standard primarily protects rights that are consistent
with societal norms and majoritarian interests, and constitutional provisions
must give more than that negligible protection. Contrary to Smith 's under-
pinnings, the Constitution and its provisions should primarily protect those
rights that go against societal norms, not with them. 23 It is axiomatic that a
pure democracy is rule by the majority, and in many cases, tyranny against
the minority. One of the primary purposes of choosing a constitutional
democracy over a pure democracy is to identify fundamental rights on
which the majority cannot infringe. It is important to have a mechanism in
place, such as a constitution, that will protect fundamental rights even when
it is not popular to do so.
In the United States' Constitution, one of these fundamental rights is
free exercise of religion. America has chosen to protect free exercise of
religion, even when it is not popular to do so. Thus, even if society does not
constituted great pressure that one may say could constitute a compelling force. Through the denial of
such an important state benefit, one can argue that this could qualify as driving someone to take a
certain course of action, and thus it would not be a misnomer to say a state could compel someone to
swear through these means.
22. To avoid the redundant use of "his or her," this Note will alternate between using "his" or
"her" rather than both as in this sentence. Unless the context indicates otherwise, both "his" or "her"
should be construed as including either gender.
23. Indeed, if society cared only about ensuring that societal norms and majoritarian interests are
protected, there would be little need for a constitution. As a republican form of government, the peo-
ple's representatives have the incentive to pass laws that conform to the majority's wishes. Otherwise,
they face getting voted out of office. Thus, in theory, most laws that are passed reflect societal norms
and trends.
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currently frown on swearing, 24 society still has an interest in ensuring that
the Constitution fulfills its role of protecting rights that are not popularly
supported. Axson-Flynn is not only a good case because it shows that Smith
primarily protects rights consistent with societal norms, but it is also a good
case because society's view against swearing has drastically changed
throughout America's history. 25 The result that a state may compel an indi-
vidual to swear is striking precisely because for most of America's history,
swearing has been against the law.
Society's trend has gone from prohibiting swearing to protecting it,
and Smith has opened the door for the final step to be taken: actually com-
pelling someone to do what once was prohibited. This result is striking
because it shows the need for the Constitution to protect minority rights
against changing societal norms. Constitutional protections for the minority
should not be subject to the changing whims of society, and Axson-Flynn is
a biting critique of Smith because it shows that is exactly what Smith has
done with the Free Exercise Clause.
2 6
As previously mentioned, however, this Note must not only show that
the consequence of allowing a state to compel someone to swear is unde-
sirable, it must also show that Smith actually allows for this consequence to
occur. As discussed below, the Tenth Circuit avoided holding in Axson-
Flynn that the plaintiff would be compelled to swear; hence, no court has
yet compelled someone to swear under Smith. However, this Note's thesis
24- However, it is not necessarily clear that swearing is still not a taboo. As commonplace as it has
become, there are still many people who continue to find it distasteful, offensive, and even harmful, and
not always for religious reasons. See MARLENE CARPENTER, THE LINK BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND
CONSCIOUSNESS: A PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (1988) (arguing that swearing negatively affects a per-
sons' attitude and well-being); JAMES V. O'CONNOR, CUSS CONTROL: THE COMPLETE BOOK ON HOW
TO CURB YOUR CURSING (2000) (arguing that cussing has become too commonplace and offers sugges-
tions to individuals to help them control their swearing).
25. Admittedly, some may object to the assertion that if the Free Exercise Clause is simply en-
forced, then the government will not be able to compel someone to swear. Clearly, the Free Exercise
Clause text says nothing about protection from compelled swearing, and one might argue that enforcing
the Free Exercise Clause does not inevitably lead to that result. However, deciding what a minimal
enforcement of the Free Exercise Clause would and would not protect is outside the scope of this Note.
This Note focuses primarily on showing that someone likely could not be compelled to swear under the
Free Exercise Clause standard prior to Smith, but that Smith made this result doctrinally possible.
26. If one still finds it difficult to see why society should be concerned about compelling someone
to swear, consider that Axson-Flynn also refused to perform any nudity. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356
F.3d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 2004). Unlike swearing, compelling someone to perform nude clearly goes
against society's mores, and one would be hard pressed to find many people who would be comfortable
with requiring someone to involuntarily undress, even among those who wish to protect the right to
perform nude. For those who would find this Note's critique of Smith more convincing if Axson-Flynn
had been compelled to perform nude, simply insert nudity wherever the Note discusses swearing,
because the analysis would not change. Under Smith, if someone can be compelled to swear, they can
be compelled to undress. Both with swearing and with performing nudity, the only viable protection
found in Smith's Free Exercise Clause against compelling an individual to do either action is the com-
passion of government leaders and entities. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
20051 1291
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is that unless Smith is reinterpreted or overruled, no doctrinal way exists to
prevent the result that a state may constitutionally compel someone to
swear in violation of his religious beliefs. Accordingly, a large part of this
Note will be devoted to examining whether there are any principled consti-
tutional arguments that Smith does not need to be modified or overruled to
prevent the result of compelled swearing.
This Note is divided into four parts. Part I will introduce Axson-Flynn
v. Johnson, discuss the facts of the case, and discuss how the lower courts
applied Smith. Part II will briefly review how the prohibition against swear-
ing stems from a deep religious tradition and how the United States has
gone from prohibiting swearing to protecting it. Part III will examine the
pre-Smith free exercise standard and how Smith changed that standard. Part
IV will defend the Note's thesis that Smith allows for state compulsion of
swearing by rebutting five arguments that contend that even under Smith, a
court need not find that a state may constitutionally compel an individual to
swear. The Note concludes that in order for state compulsion of swearing to
be considered unconstitutional, Smith must be overruled or reinterpreted.
I. AXSON-FLYNN v. JoHNsoN
Christina Axson-Flynn ("Axson-Flynn") grew up wanting to be an ac-
tress. 27 Raised by two professional actors,28 Axson-Flynn was surrounded
by the theater world and discovered early that she had a love for acting.
29
In 1998, Axson-Flynn applied to the University of Utah's Actor Training
Program ("ATP"), a highly respected acting program. 30 During Axson-
Flynn's audition, the program directors asked her if there was anything she
felt uncomfortable doing. 31 Axson-Flynn responded that she would not
remove her clothing, "take the name of God in vain, take the name of
Christ in vain or say the four-letter expletive beginning with the letter F."'32
Following a discussion where the directors attempted to persuade Axson-
Flynn that it was appropriate at times to say those words as an actress, Ax-
son-Flynn stated that she "would rather not be admitted to [the] program
than use these words."33
27. Brief for Appellant at 5, Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d 1277 (No. 01-4176).
28. Both of Axson-Flynn's parents have had successful acting careers, appearing in productions
ranging from television's Touched by an Angel to the movie Footloose. Id. at 4-5.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Id. at 5-6.
31. Axson-Flynn,356F.3dat 1281.
32. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
33, Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Axson-Flynn's refusal to perform any nude scenes or swear 34
stemmed from her religious beliefs as a practicing member of The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints ("Mormon" or "LDS").35 Axson-Flynn
believed it was against the Ten Commandments to use the name of deity in
a profane way.36 She also found it religiously offensive to use the "F" word
because it vulgarized what she as a Mormon considered to be a sacred
act.
37
Axson-Flynn was subsequently admitted to the ATP and began classes
that fall. 38 Because nothing else was said about her refusal to perform nu-
dity or say certain words, Axson-Flynn assumed that her acceptance into
the ATP was not conditioned on her willingness to do those things.39 Dur-
ing the semester, Axson-Flynn was assigned to perform a monologue called
Friday, which included two profane references to deity.40 Without notify-
ing her instructor, Axson-Flynn deleted the offending words but performed
the rest of the monologue as written.41 She received an "A" grade on the
assignment.4
2
Later in the semester, Axson-Flynn was assigned to play the part of an
unmarried girl who recently had an abortion in a scene from a play titled
Quadrangle.43 The scene required Axson-Flynn to say the "F" word as well
as profane the name of deity multiple times. 44 Although Axson-Flynn did
not have any concerns with the role itself, she informed the instructor that
she objected to using the words in the scene.45 The instructor responded by
inquiring why she had been willing to say the words in the monologue
Friday but not in Quadrangle.4 6 When the instructor learned that Axson-
34. Axson-Flynn objected only to saying the "F" word and the name of deity. She was not op-
posed to saying other words that might be considered swearing, such as "shit" or "damn." Id. at 1281
n.2.
35. Members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints are often popularly referred to as
"Mormons" because of their belief in a book they hold to be scripture, titled The Book of Mormon:
Another Testament of Jesus Christ.
36. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1328 (D. Utah 2001), rev'd, 356 F.3d 1277
(10th Cit. 2004).
37. Id. For a general view of how Mormons view intercourse as a sacred act, see Jeffrey R. Hol-
land's talk entitled Of Souls, Symbols, and Sacraments, in JEFFREY R. HOLLAND & PATRICIA T.
HOLLAND, ON EARTH AS IT IS IN HEAVEN 182 (1989), talk available at
http://speeches.byu.edu/htmlfiles/holland88.html.
38. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1281.
39 Brief for Appellant at 7, Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d 1277 (No. 01-4176).
40. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1281.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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Flynn had omitted the words from the Friday monologue, she became an-
gry and told Axson-Flynn that she would have to "get over" her language
concerns and that she could "still be a good Mormon and say these
words."'47 Axson-Flynn asked whether she could do another scene instead,
but the instructor refused, stating that she must perform the Quadrangle4g
scene as written or take a zero on the assignment.49 Axson-Flynn re-
sponded that she would take a zero on this assignment or any other assign-
ment that would require her to say those words. 50
The instructor made an effort to persuade Axson-Flynn to change her
mind and gave her the weekend to think it over, but when Axson-Flynn
again confirmed after the weekend that she would rather receive a zero on
the assignment than say the words, the instructor relented and allowed her
to omit the words from the scene. 51 Axson-Flynn again received a high
grade for her performance.5 2 For the rest of the semester, Axson-Flynn was
allowed to omit the specific words that she had refused to say from her
assignments.53
At the end of the semester, Axson-Flynn attended her semester review
and was informed by two of her instructors and the head of the ATP that
her refusal to swear was "unacceptable behavior." 54 They encouraged her
to talk with other Mormon girls who were good Mormons, but who did not
have a problem saying the words.55 Axson-Flynn's review ended with an
ultimatum from the instructors: "You can choose to continue in the pro-
gram if you modify your values. If you don't, you can leave. That's your
choice." 5
6
47. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Ironically, when Jon Jory, the author of Quadrangle, later learned about the case, she indicated
that she would have had no problem allowing Axson-Flynn to omit the words from the script. In a
telephone interview with the Salt Lake City Weekly, Jory explained,
[i]f it's true that she couldn't get a grade because she wouldn't say those words, that would
strike me as being tasteless. If someone had an ethical or moral reason for why they wouldn't
want to do the scene, I'd assign them another scene or let them sit it out.
Ben Fulton, Profane Charges, Profound Questions, SALT LAKE CITY WKLY., Feb. 3, 2000, at 10.
49. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1282.
50. Id. Axson-Flynn, however, had no objections to other people in the class using the words, and
in fact, her acting partner in the Quadrangle scene used the words without her objection. Axson-Flynn's
only objection was to having to use the words herself; she did not object to the class curriculum itself.
Brief for Appellant at 9, Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d 1277 (No. 01-4176).





56. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Axson-Flynn appealed to the coordinator of the ATP program, but he
stood by the instructors' decision.57 Following the start of Axson-Flynn's
second semester, the instructor continued to pressure Axson-Flynn to use
the offensive language. 58 Axson-Flynn finally went to the director of the
ATP one more time and clarified with him that the ATP's stance was that
Axson-Flynn either needed to use the language or leave the program. 59 The
director confirmed that this was correct, and Axson-Flynn left the
program. 60
Axson-Flynn subsequently sued the various individuals from the Uni-
versity of Utah's ATP for violating her First Amendment free exercise
rights. 61 The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, finding that Axson-Flynn's free exercise rights had not been
violated.62 The district court cited Employment Division v. Smith, which
held that neutral rules of general applicability do not violate the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, even if they burden a particular reli-
gious practice or belief.63 Finding that the instructor's policy of prohibiting
script changes was neutral and generally applicable, the district court held
that the instructors and leaders of the ATP did not violate Axson-Flynn's
free exercise rights.64
On appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court, finding that summary judgment was inappropriate. 65 The
Tenth Circuit held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the ATP's requirements were actually neutral or whether they
were a pretext for discriminating against Axson-Flynn's religious beliefs.
66
The Tenth Circuit also found that there was a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether Axson-Flynn qualified for the Smith's individualized-
exemption exception. 67 Smith held that when the government gives indi-




60. Id. at 1282-83.
61. Id. at 1283. Axson-Flynn also sued for violation of her free speech rights but was unsuccessful
with that claim as well. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1328 (D. Utah 2001), revd,
356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
62. Axson-Flynn, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 1342.
63. Id. at 1330-31.
64. Id. at 1331, 1334.
65. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1301.
66. Id. at 1294.
67. Id. at 1299.
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refuse to extend those exemptions to cases of religious hardship without
showing a compelling state interest.68
The Tenth Circuit emphasized that while Axson-Flynn was in the
ATP, a Jewish student was allowed to miss certain assignments because of
Jewish holidays, despite the fact that the assignments could not be made
up.69 The Jewish student was not penalized in any way for missing these
assignments. 70 Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that there was an issue of mate-
rial fact as to whether the individualized-exemption exception from Smith
should have been applied to Axson-Flynn's case. 71 The Tenth Circuit re-
versed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings to
determine whether the ATP's policy was actually neutral and whether the
individualized-exemption exception applied. 72 However, the Tenth Circuit
opinion made it clear that if the ATP's policy was actually neutral and gen-
erally applicable, the Free Exercise Clause would not prohibit the Univer-
sity from requiring Axson-Flynn to use the religiously offensive words.
Before further action was taken at the district court level, however, Axson-
Flynn and the University of Utah reached a settlement, 73 and the case was
dropped.
II. SWEARING AS PROHIBITED BEHAVIOR IN SOCIETY
A. The Prohibition Against Swearing in Religious Society
Many of the major world religions have a rich tradition of prohibitions
against swearing, particularly two of the world's great religions, Judaism
and Christianity. A religious prohibition against swearing begins at least
with the first monotheistic religion: Judaism. It is found in the third com-
mandment of the Decalogue, "[t]hou shalt not take the name of the Lord
thy God in vain; for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his
name in vain."'74 Not only is profaning God's name prohibited in Judaism,
68. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
69. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1298.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1299.
72. Id. at 1301.
73. The settlement required the University of Utah to appoint a committee to create a policy
allowing students to request a reasonable accommodation based on sincerely held religious beliefs. The
policy would also include an appeals process for students whose requests are denied. In addition to the
policy, the University of Utah reimbursed Axson-Flynn for her attorneys' fees, tuition, and fees. The
school also offered her an invitation to rejoin the ATP, which Axson-Flynn declined. Angie Welling,
U., Axson-Flynn Settle Civil Rights Suit, DESERET MORNING NEWS, July 15, 2004, at Al.
74. Exodus 20:7 (King James).
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but so is using sexually profane language. According to the Talmud, "[a]ll
know for what purpose a bride enters the bridal canopy, yet against whom-
soever who speaks obscenely [thereof], even if a sentence of seventy years'
happiness had been sealed for him, it is reversed for evil."
75
As an offshoot of Judaism, Christianity also embraces the Old Testa-
ment commandment against swearing, and the prohibition is renewed in the
New Testament. The Apostle Paul instructed ancient Christians to "put off
all these; anger, wrath, malice, blasphemy, filthy communication out of
your mouth," 76 while the Apostle James proclaimed that,
the tongue can no man tame; it is an unruly evil, full of deadly poison.
Therewith bless we God, even the Father; and therewith curse we men,
which are made after the similitude of God. Out of the same mouth pro-
ceedeth blessing and cursing. My brethren, these things ought not so to
be.7
7
As a subset of Christianity,78 Axson-Flynn's LDS faith embraces both
the Old and New Testament teachings on swearing and adds some of its
own. Mormon leaders have consistently taught that to "strip profanity and
vulgarity from one's vocabulary not only is commendable and a mark of
refinement but it is also a commandment from God." 79 A recent booklet
authorized by the present-day Mormon prophet and apostles counsels Mor-
mon youth to:
Always use the names of God and Jesus Christ with reverence and
respect. Misusing their names is a sin. Profane, vulgar, or crude language
or gestures, as well as jokes about immoral actions, are offensive to the
Lord and to others. Foul language harms your spirit and degrades you.
Do not let others influence you to use it.80
Thus, the prohibition against swearing and using sexual terms as pro-
fanity has a rich religious history, and the prohibition is still in force for
millions of religious individuals across the world.
75. THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD 153 (Rabbi Dr I. Epstein ed., trans., 1938).
76. Colossians 3:8 (King James).
77. James 3:8-10 (King James).
78. Many people would deny that Mormonism is a Christian religion and would vehemently argue
against categorizing it as a subset of Christianity. The argument that Mormonism is not a Christian
church stems primarily from Mormonism's rejection of certain traditions recognized in other Christian
churches, such as a closed cannon of scripture, the Trinitarian three-in-one concept, and a strict dichot-
omy of heaven and hell. The Mormon Church argues just as vehemently that it is a Christian church and
points to the fact that it believes Jesus Christ of the New Testament was the Messiah, and that it accepts
both the Old and New Testament as scripture. Obviously, these debates are not relevant to this Note and
far exceed its scope. For an interesting discussion on the topic, see CRAIG L. BLOMBERG & STEPHEN E.
ROBINSON, How WIDE THE DIVIDE: A MORMON & AN EVANGELICAL IN CONVERSATION (1997).
79. Grant Von Harrison, Profanity, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MORMONISM 1158 (Daniel H. Ludlow
ed., 1992).




B. The Evolution from Prohibiting Swearing to Protecting Swearing
Early American law reflected the Judeo-Christian prohibition against
swearing.81 The fourteen states that had ratified the Constitution by 1792
also had made blasphemy, profanity, or both, statutory crimes. 82 Despite
the fact that ten of those fourteen states had guarantees of free speech in
their constitutions, none of them saw a conflict between prohibiting blas-
phemy and profanity and the guarantee of free speech.83 In at least one
case, even when swearing was not a statutory crime, one state supreme
court held that it was a criminal offense at common law. 84 Although the
penalty for swearing was not heavy, most people in early America agreed
with New York Supreme Court Chief Justice James Kent's statement that
"[n]othing could be more offensive to the virtuous part of the community,
or more injurious to the tender morals of the young, than to declare such
profanity lawful. 85
Until World War 1, swearing continued to be seen as mostly disgrace-
ful and characteristic of a vulgar person.86 Things began to change during
World War I and World War II, when among soldiers, swearing became a
sign of manliness. 87 The American public was not willing to censure the
soldiers' swearing too harshly, however, because it was thought that young
men who were sent off to kill and be killed should be given latitude for the
vice, and it struck many as unpatriotic to criticize them for it.88 Notwith-
standing the prevalence of swearing among soldiers, increased swearing
was not limited to just soldiers, and wartime enthusiasm served as an ex-
cuse for members of the public to also violate society's swearing taboo. 89
As one editor reported, '"[o]ne can hardly talk of the Kaiser,' . . . without
using the word 'damn.' 90
81. Some may argue there is a slight difference between swearing and profanity, but this Note will
use them interchangeably. See entries for "swearword" and "profanity" in Webster's College Diction-
ary. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 1077, 1349 (defining
profanity as "irreverent or blasphemous speech" and a swearword as "a profane or obscene word").
82. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 104 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 n.12 (1957) (listing various state statutes that prohibited profanity or
blasphemy in 1792).
83. See Updegraph v. Commonwealth, II Serg. & Rawle 394 (Pa. 1824) (holding that blasphemy
and profanity are not protected under the free speech provision of the state constitution).
84. People Against Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811).
85. Id. at 293.
86. JOHN C. BURNHAM, BAD HABITS: DRINKING, SMOKING, TAKING DRUGS, GAMBLING, SEXUAL
MISBEHAVIOR, AND SWEARING IN AMERICAN HISTORY 210,216 (1993).
87. Id. at 216-23.
88. Id. at 216, 220,
89. Id. at 217.
90. Id. at 216.
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Nevertheless, despite the loosening of society's swearing taboo, long
after the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the First Amendment and
applied it against the states, swearing could still be punished without violat-
ing free speech. In 1942, the Supreme Court opined that there were "certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which has never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem." 91 Included among these limited classes of speech was profanity,
which tended by "[its] very utterance [to] inflict injury or ... incite an im-
mediate breach of the peace."'92
If the World Wars cracked opened the door to public swearing, the
Vietnam and Watergate era unscrewed the hinges and removed the door.
The Vietnam War was fertile ground for forces that advocated for unlim-
ited expression rights and for anything that might spurn and shock those in
authority. 93 Radical leaders and youth sought for more opportunity to level
the playing field with authority figures and organizations. Bobby Seale of
the Black Panthers typified many youths prone to profanity at that time
when he shrugged off criticism of his swearing by responding that "the
filthiest word I know is 'kill' and this is what other men have done to the
Negro for years. ' 94 Times had drastically changed for society's swearing
taboo, and for many people, "censorship" was a dirtier word than any
swear word could ever be.
Finally in 1971, the changed atmosphere reached the Supreme Court,
and the Court held for the first time that the First Amendment protected
profanity from being prohibited outright. 95 The Court narrowed its prior
decision in Chaplinsky by holding that profanity did not automatically
breach the peace but required some additional threatening action to accom-
pany it.96 The Court later affirmed this holding and found that profanity
used to rile up an antiwar crowd was not "fighting words" for purposes of
the First Amendment and was thus protected speech.97 Swearing's journey
from prohibition to protection was complete.
91. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
92. Id. at 572.
93. Revelations that "prudish" leaders such as President Nixon, who once attacked an opponent
for using a mild expletive, was himself excessively foulmouthed also added fuel to the fire. BURNHAM,
supra note 86, at 225.
94. Id.
95. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
96. Id- at 26-
97. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (per curiam).
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1II. SWEARING AS A COMPELLED BEHAVIOR IN SOCIETY?
A. The Doctrine of Free Exercise Prior to Employment Division v. Smith
Like other constitutional doctrines, the Supreme Court's free exercise
doctrine has not remained static and has developed incrementally over
time. Prior to Smith, the Court's free exercise doctrine can be categorized
into three different periods: (1) The Reynolds Years (1791-1890), (2) The
Cantwell Years (1891-1959), and (3) the Sherbert Years (1960-1990).
1. The Reynolds Years: 1791-1890
The first hundred years of the free exercise debate were relatively
quiet and almost silent until 1878, when the Supreme Court decided Rey-
nolds v. United States.98 In Reynolds, the Supreme Court upheld a federal
law prohibiting plural marriage. 99 The defendant, a Mormon, argued that
because it was his religious duty to practice plural marriage, he was pro-
tected by the Free Exercise Clause. 100 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument by distinguishing between beliefs and conduct and stating that
"Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was
left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subver-
sive of good order."10' Finding that plural marriage "fetters the people in
stationary despotism," and thus "was subversive of good order," the Court
held that the Free Exercise Clause did not protect the defendant's practice
of plural marriage. 102 Other free exercise cases that followed during this
period dealt primarily with upholding various federal prohibitions and pen-
alties on plural marriage. 1
03
2. The Cantwell Years: 1891-1959
Beginning in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century, the Su-
preme Court began to hear more free exercise cases. Jehovah's Witnesses
provided the impetus for most of the cases brought throughout this pe-
98. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
99. Id. at 168.
100. Id. at 161-62.
101- Id. at 164.
102. Id. at 164-67
103. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1
(1890) (upholding the confiscation of church property for continuing to teach polygamy); Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890) (holding that individuals can be required to take an oath that they do not
belong to any order teaching polygamy before they are allowed to vote); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S.
15 (1885) (upholding Congressional Act excluding polygamists from voting or holding office).
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riod. 104 In the most famous case of this period, Cantwell v. Connecticut, the
Supreme Court incorporated the Free Exercise Clause into the Fourteenth
Amendment and struck down a state law prohibiting solicitation of funds
without a license. 105 The Jehovah's Witnesses violated the law by distribut-
ing religious literature and asking for donations without obtaining a li-
cense. 106 The Court once again recognized the distinction from Reynolds
between the freedom to believe and the freedom to act and stated that al-
though protection of belief was absolute, the protection of religious conduct
was "subject to regulation for the protection of society." 107 However, be-
cause the Jehovah's Witnesses' actions of handing out religious literature
did not breach the peace in any way, the Court held their conduct was pro-
tected by the Free Exercise Clause.' 08
Another seminal First Amendment case during this period was West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, in which the Court struck
down a law requiring all students in public schools to participate in saluting
the flag. 109 Jehovah's Witnesses once again led the way by refusing to par-
ticipate in the pledge because it violated their religious beliefs. I 0 In lofty
and exalting language, the Court penned that "[o]ne's right to life, liberty,
and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assem-
bly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they de-
pend on the outcome of no elections."' 1 The Court thus emphatically
struck down the state law requiring the pledge as violating both free speech
and free exercise rights. 11
2
Not all of the cases during this period, however, were a triumph for
free exercise rights,1 13 and as with Barnette, many of the victories of reli-
gious freedom were grounded primarily under the rubric of free speech,
104. See Scott E. Thompson, Comment, The Demise of Free Exercise: An Historical Analysis of
Where We Are, and How We Got There, 1 REGENT U. L. REV. 169, 176 & n.47 (1998) (listing the free
exercise cases during this period and noting that the majority of them were municipal ordinances chal-
lenged by Jehovah's Witnesses).
105. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
106. Id. at 301-02.
107. Id- at 303-04.
108. Id- at 311.
109. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
110. Id. at 629.
111. Id. at 638.
112. ld. at 642.
113. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding conviction of woman who
violated child labor laws because she believed it was her child's religious duty to pass out religious
literature); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (holding that state university
may require courses in military training even if against religious beliefs).
1301
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rather than free exercise.1 14 In the free exercise area, the Court's main
thrust up through this period seemed to be that the Free Exercise Clause did
protect religious conduct, but religious conduct could still be regulated to
protect society and social order.115 Additionally, more potent protection
was available if the conduct could be cast as a free speech issue as well as a
free exercise one.
3. The Sherbert Years: 1960-1990
The pinnacle of free exercise protection blossomed in 1963 when the
Supreme Court decided Sherbert v. Verner.116 In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day
Adventist was fired from her work because she refused to work on Satur-
day, her religious Sabbath. 117 When the plaintiff was subsequently unable
to find work because of her refusal to work Saturdays, she filed for unem-
ployment compensation; however, the Employment Security Commission
("ESC") denied her benefits because it determined that her refusal to work
Saturdays disqualified her for eligibility."18
In examining whether the ESC's actions violated the Free Exercise
Clause, the Supreme Court laid out a two-part test that countless subse-
quent cases would echo as the free exercise standard: potential violations of
the Free Exercise Clause depend on (1) whether the state's action burdens
the individual's free exercise of his religion, 119 and (2) if so, whether the
state has a compelling interest 120 that justifies the infringement.121 In expli-
cating the second prong, the Court declared that "no showing merely of a
114. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking down ordinance prohibiting distri-
bution of literature and handbills as a violation of free speech and freedom of the press).
115. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (state may "safeguard the peace, good
order and comfort of the community" without violating free exercise).
116. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
117. Id. at 399.
118- Id. at 399-401. The South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act provided that, to be
eligible for benefits, "a claimant must be able to work and ... available to work; and, further, that a
claimant is ineligible for benefits if... he has failed, without good cause ... to accept available suitable
work when offered him by the employment office or the employer." Id. at 400-01 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). The Employment Security Commission felt that by refusing to work
Saturdays, the plaintiff was refusing available suitable work and thus was ineligible for benefits. Id.
119. Id. at 403. Although North Carolina's law was not directly prohibiting the plaintiff from
exercising her religious rights, the Supreme Court found that the state was indirectly burdening her
rights by withholding benefits from her. The Court held that this indirect burden was sufficient to
trigger the protection of the First Amendment. Id. at 403-06.
120. Id- Subsequent Court decisions affirmed that the Sherbert case did indeed lay out a compelling
interest standard for the free exercise area. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of
Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 140 (1987) ("We concluded [in Sherbert] that the State had imposed a burden...
that had not been justified by a compelling state interest."); Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Employment
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) ("The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing
that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest.").
121. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at403.
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rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this
highly sensitive constitutional area, only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."122 The Court
found no such state interest present in Sherbert, and thus held the state's
withholding of unemployment benefits unconstitutional.1
23
Another well-known case during this period is Wisconsin v. Yoder, in
which the Supreme Court applied the compelling interest standard from
Sherbert and struck down Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law
as it applied to the Amish. 124 The state of Wisconsin had argued that while
religious beliefs were clearly free of state control, religious conduct was
outside the protection of the First Amendment.125 The Court stated that its
precedent rejected the idea that the First Amendment did not protect reli-
gious conduct. 126 The Court also flatly recognized that a "regulation neutral
on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exer-
cise of religion."' 127 Thus, although the Court recognized that Wisconsin's
interest in compulsory education after the eighth grade was highly impor-
tant, that interest was not sufficient to overcome the Amish's free exercise
rights. 128
Although the Supreme Court continued to maintain that the compel-
ling interest standard was the proper standard for the Free Exercise Clause,
Sherbert and Yoder represent the apex of free exercise protection. Admit-
tedly, the Supreme Court did not always follow its own lofty language in
applying the compelling interest test; 129 more often than not, the Court
applied varying forms of heightened scrutiny instead. 130 However, even in
the Court's most watered down free exercise cases, the Court still subjected
the state's actions to some form of heightened scrutiny; the Court's stan-
dard was never the toothless rationality review that would come from
Smith. 131
122. Id. at 406 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).
123. Id. at 407.
124. 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972). The Amish refused to send their children to public schools after the
8th grade because they felt their children's religious beliefs and upbringing would be corrupted by
public schools. Id. at 210-1I.
125. Id. at 219.
126. !d. at 219-20.
127. Id. at 220.
128. Id. at 213-
129. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) (commenting that
according to the Court's reasoning, the Court must be applying a different standard than that of a com-
pelling interest one).
130. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1127.
131. Id- at 1128.
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Thus, prior to Smith, an individual like Axson-Flynn would likely
have been protected against compelled swearing unless it could be shown
that her refusal was "subversive of good order"'132 or that the compulsion
was necessary to protect society. 133 Because either argument would be
difficult to make successfully, free exercise doctrine prior to Smith likely
was sufficient to find state compulsion of swearing unconstitutional. If an
individual would likely have been protected against swearing under the
early Reynolds and Cantwell free exercise standards, surely a state could
not have constitutionally compelled an individual to swear under Sherbert's
compelling interest standard.
B. Employment Division v. Smith
Because most scholars and courts agreed prior to Smith that the Free
Exercise Clause provided individuals some form of heightened scrutiny
protection, if not always a compelling interest one, the Smith decision dras-
tically changed the free exercise landscape. When Smith was argued before
the Supreme Court, the legal world barely took notice. At the time, the free
exercise area was fairly stable, and although some criticized the Court's
free exercise doctrine, most legal scholars and lower courts agreed on what
the test was, even if they disagreed on its application. 134 From the innocu-
ous facts of Smith, very few in the legal world, if any, saw the dark clouds
on the free exercise horizon and the storm that the Court was about to
unleash.
The facts of Smith were straightforward. Two individuals were fired
from their jobs because they had ingested peyote. 135 The plaintiffs were
members of the Native American Church and had ingested the peyote as
part of a religious ceremony. 136 When the plaintiffs filed for unemployment
benefits from Oregon, they were denied because they had been discharged
for "misconduct." 137 No one ever disputed that the defendant's religious
beliefs were sincere or that they only ingested peyote for religious
purposes. 13 8
132. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). As discussed previously in this Note,
during the time when Reynolds was decided, swearing was actually against the law; therefore, there
would have been virtually no possibility that the state could have compelled someone to swear. How-
ever, even if one extrapolates Reynolds' reasoning to today's society, one would be hard pressed to
persuasively argue that someone's religious refusal to swear is subversive of good order.
133. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
134. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1109-10.





MORE ROTTED FRUIT: AXSON-FLYNN V. JOHNSON
The plaintiffs appealed the denial of benefits, and the Oregon Court of
Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court sided with the plaintiffs. 139 The
Oregon Supreme Court held that the denial of unemployment benefits un-
justifiably burdened the defendant's religious beliefs and thus violated the
Free Exercise Clause. 140 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the case
but remanded it to the Oregon State Supreme Court for a determination of
whether Oregon's controlled substance law prohibited the religious use of
peyote. 141 The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that Oregon state law pro-
hibited the ceremonial use of peyote but noted that this fact was hypotheti-
cal because Oregon did not currently enforce its drug laws against
sacramental peyote use. 142 The Oregon Supreme Court also noted that this
fact was irrelevant as well, because even if Oregon did enforce its drug
laws against sacramental peyote use, Oregon state law was interpreted so
that religiously motivated conduct could not be considered "misconduct"
for purposes of unemployment benefits.143 Despite the fact that the ques-
tion of whether Oregon's drug laws prohibited the sacramental use of pe-
yote was both hypothetical and irrelevant, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari once again. 14
4
Both sides focused their briefs and oral arguments on whether the state
had a compelling interest in controlling drug use that would justify infring-
ing the plaintiffs' free exercise rights. 145 The State of Oregon expressly
conceded in its brief that the compelling interest standard was the appropri-
ate standard, and neither party asked the Court to reconsider its free exer-
cise standard. 146 Indeed, neither of the parties ever touched on or discussed
the applicability of any other standard besides the compelling interest stan-
dard.147 Thus, as one prominent legal scholar opined "[t]he most important
decision interpreting the Free Exercise Clause in recent history, then, was
rendered in a case in which the question presented was entirely hypotheti-
cal, irrelevant to the disposition of the case as a matter of state law, and
neither briefed nor argued by the parties."'1 4
8
139. Id. at874-75.
140. Id. at 875.
141. Id. at 875-76.
142. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1112-13.
143. Id. at 1112.
144. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876.
145. McConnell, supra note 8, at 1113.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1114.
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The Smith opinion began by pointing out the well-known distinction
in free exercise doctrine between religious belief and religious conduct.
149
Acknowledging the uncontroversial principle that the First Amendment
"excludes all governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such," the
Court then proceeded to draw a line between permissible government regu-
lations and nonpermissible government regulations. 150 The Court stated
that if a law sought to ban conduct only when that conduct was done for
religious reasons, that law would likelyl5' run afoul of the First Amend-
ment. However, if the law prohibited the conduct without regard to whether
there was a religious motivation behind it, the law would not violate the
First Amendment. 152
Whereas Reynolds focused on protecting religious conduct as long as
it was not subversive of good order 153 and Sherbert focused on whether the
state could justify regulating religious conduct through a compelling state
interest, 154 the Smith opinion focused on whether the state law was a neu-
tral and generally applicable one. 155 Thus, the new Smith free exercise
standard was born: "if prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is not the
object of the [law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been
offended." 156
Instead of recognizing the new standard the Court had created, the
Court insisted that this test was not new at all, but was supported by the
Court's "record of more than a century of... free exercise jurispru-
dence."' 157 However, the Court was then left with the difficult task of dis-
tinguishing many of its cases, such as Yoder and Sherbert, which virtually
149. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
150. Id.
151 . The Court was even hesitant to give this much protection to religious conduct as it pointed out
that no case has involved the hypothetical law it was discussing, and thus the Court could only "think"
that the First Amendment would strike down such a law. Id. This view was later affirmed, however, in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (striking down a
law that was intended solely to prohibit religious conduct).
152. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
153. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
154. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
155. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
156. Id.
157. Id at 879. The idea that the Court had never held that the free exercise clause required exemp-
tions from generally applicable law is curious because Justices who had disagreed with allowing reli-
gious exemptions had often dissented on that very point. Even more curiously, Justice Scalia, who
authored the majority opinion in Smith, had stated fourteen months earlier that the Free Exercise Clause
granted religion-specific exemptions from otherwise applicable laws. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1, 38 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[W]e [have] held that the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment required religious beliefs to be accommodated by granting religion-specific exemp-
tions from otherwise applicable laws.") (emphasis in original).
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everyone had understood to stand for the very proposition the Court was
now rejecting. The Court distinguished these cases by dividing them into
two different categories and designating each a precedential "exception" to
the Smith rule, which refused to exempt religious conduct from generally
applicable laws. 5
8
The Court dealt with cases such as Cantwell, Barnette, and Yoder by
stating that these cases provided an exception to the Smith rule, because
these cases involved not only the Free Exercise Clause, but the Free Exer-
cise Clause in conjunction with some other constitutional provision. 159 In
this revisionist light, Ccntwell and Barnette involved both the Free Exer-
cise Clause and the Free Speech Clause, while Yoder involved the Free
Exercise Clause and the fundamental right of parents to direct the upbring-
ing of their children. 160 Thus, this exception holds that although the Free
Exercise Clause alone provides no assistance against a generally applicable
law, another constitutional right can be joined with the Free Exercise
Clause to provide the equivalent of a constitutional steroid. This exception
has become known as the "hybrids rights exception."
The other line of cases the Court had to deal with were those repre-
sented by Sherbert. The Court here acknowledged that although the Court
had purported to apply the Sherbert test in other contexts besides state un-
employment compensation rules, the test had always been satisfied. 161
Hence, the Court had the luxury of simply limiting the Sherbert test to the
unemployment compensation field. 162 However, wanting to further prop up
its shaky assertion that its new test was supported by precedent, the Court
held that even if Sherbert applied outside of the unemployment compensa-
tion context, Sherbert simply stood for the proposition that "where the
State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to
extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling rea-
son."' 163 Thus, when a state has decided to allow individual exemptions
from a certain law, the state must have a compelling interest for not extend-
ing that exemption to religious individuals. This second exception has be-
come known as the "individualized exemptions exception."
Having dispensed with its troublesome precedent, the Smith Court
then finished its opinion by discussing the policy justifications for the new
158. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-85.
159- Id. at 881.
160. Id. at 881-82.
161. Id. at 883.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 884.
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standard along with its ramifications. 164 The Court primarily focused its
policy argument on the "parade of horribles"'165 that would follow from
allowing a person, through the use of his religious beliefs, to be exempt
from generally applicable laws. 166 In the Court's words, it would allow the
individual "to become a law unto himself."167 The Court then set out a long
list of laws that the religious person might opt out of if the Court required
the state to show a compelling interest and opined that allowing "a private
right to ignore generally applicable laws... [would produce] a constitu-
tional anomaly" that was unheard of in constitutional jurisprudence. 1
68
However, recognizing that there would be those who would be con-
cerned about the tattered remnants of free exercise protection after its deci-
sion, the Court offered the hope that perhaps the political process might be
more protective of free exercise concerns than the Constitution seemed to
be. 169 The Court mused that because society itself valued religious belief,
then perhaps legislatures would be solicitous of religious values and inde-
pendently exempt some religious conduct from its laws. 170 The Court then
ended its opinion with an observation that seems widely out of place in a
constitutional decision that would be laughable if it were not so serious:
"[i]t may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process
will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic gov-
ernment must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law
unto itself."' 17 1 And thus the Court ended its opinion with the odd implica-
tion that protection of religious free exercise must primarily come from
politics, not from the Constitution itself.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMPELLED SWEARING UNDER SMITH
As discussed previously, the thesis of this Note is that under Smith, it
becomes very difficult doctrinally to avoid reaching the result that a state
may constitutionally compel somebody to violate his religious beliefs by
swearing. This section explores five arguments that contend that even un-
der Smith, the Free Exercise Clause provides sufficient protection against
compelled swearing. If any one of these arguments can show that under a
164. Id. at 886-90.
165. Id. at 889 n.5.
166. Id. at 888-89.
167. Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)).
168. Id.
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current interpretation of Smith, a state may constitutionally compel some-
one to swear, then this Note's criticism of Smith becomes unfounded.
The five arguments rely on five alternate, independent bases: (1) the
hybrid rights exception from Smith; (2) the individualized-exemption ex-
ception from Smith; (3) protection under other constitutional provisions,
such as the Free Speech Clause; (4) a criminal/noncriminal distinction; or
(5) a compelled/prohibited distinction.
A. Smith's Hybrid Rights Exception
As discussed previously, the Smith Court recognized two exceptions
to the Smith rule that a neutral and generally applicable law would not vio-
late the Free Exercise Clause.] 72 The first of these two exceptions is known
as the hybrid rights exception. The hybrid rights exception holds that when
a free exercise claim is combined with another constitutional claim, the
state must show a compelling state interest that would justify infringing on
the individual's free exercise rights. 173 In other words, by joining a free
exercise claim with another constitutional claim, the plaintiff's cause of
action is transformed into a highly potent constitutional argument that dras-
tically increases the amount of free exercise protection in comparison to
what the Free Exercise Clause provides standing alone.
Thus, as long as one can allege two constitutional violations, then the
state must show a compelling state interest before it could require that indi-
vidual to swear. It is difficult to imagine what compelling state interest a
state could put forward that would justify requiring someone to swear.
Therefore, if another constitutional violation could be argued, then the hy-
brid rights exception would most likely be sufficient to prevent the unde-
sired result of compelling someone to swear.
Because swearing is a form of speech, the seemingly natural constitu-
tional companion would be the Free Speech Clause. Unquestionably, the
Free Speech Clause protects not only the right to speak, but also the right to
refrain from speaking. 174 Accordingly, a corresponding free speech right to
refrain from swearing should exist. Hence, by joining a free exercise claim
172. Id. at 881-88.
173. Id. at 881.
174. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
573 (1995) ("[O]ne important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to
speak may also decide 'what not to say."'); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) ("We begin
with the proposition that [First Amendment protection] includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all."); W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(holding that the Free Speech Clause protected against being compelled to say the Pledge of Alle-
giance).
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and a free speech claim, the Smith hybrid rights exception should, in the-
ory, be sufficient to prevent a state from constitutionally compelling some-
one to swear without having to modify or overrule Smith.
Unfortunately, the hybrids rights exception from Smith does not go
very far in preventing compelled swearing for two reasons: (1) the Smith
Court likely did not intend the hybrid rights exception to be an actual sub-
stantive exception, and (2) even if the Smith Court was serious about the
exception, the test itself is illogical and unworkable.
1. The Supreme Court in Smith likely did not intend the hybrid rights
exception to be a substantive exception.
In all likelihood, the Smith Court never meant the hybrid rights excep-
tion to be a substantive exception. The Smith Court introduced the hybrid
rights exception in two sentences in which it distinguished past cases that
had used the compelling interest test. 175 The Court then added one more
sentence to state that the Smith facts did not involve a hybrid rights
claim. ' 76 The Court thus efficiently dealt with the entire exception in three
sentences-not what one would expect for a substantive exception. The
Court gave no further details on how broad the exception should be, how
the exception would work, or how viable the exception would be in the
future. As one Smith critic deadpanned after rhetorically asking why the
Court did not address a possible hybrid claim in Smith,177 "[tihe answer, a
legal realist would tell us, is that the Smith Court's notion of 'hybrid'
claims was not intended to be taken seriously."'
1 78
Indeed, at least one circuit, the Sixth Circuit, has agreed with the
above critic's assertion and has refused to take the hybrid rights exception
seriously. After a plaintiff argued that the hybrid rights exception required
the court to use the higher compelling interest standard, the Sixth Circuit
declined to recognize the hybrid rights exception until the Supreme Court
made it clear that it actually intended for the exception to actually exist.
179
The Second Circuit has also cast doubt on the exception, stating that the
exception is dictum and thus not binding on them.'
80
175. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
176. Id.
177. The argument for finding a hybrid claim in Smith is that ingesting peyote in a sacred ritual is a
form of communication about the adherent's faith in his church, and thus a form of symbolic speech.
Thus, the argument goes, the prohibition against peyote use infringed on both free exercise rights and
free speech rights and hence, the hybrid rights exception should have been available in Smith. McCon-
nell, supra note 8, at 1122.
178. Id.
179. Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of Ohio St. Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993).
180. Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F. 3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001).
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2. The hybrid rights exception is too illogical and unworkable to give
sufficient protection against compelled swearing.
Even if the Smith Court intended for the hybrid rights exception to be
an actual exception rather than a convenient tool to distinguish precedent,
the test itself has been heavily criticized as illogical and unworkable.
18 1
Justice Souter, in a subsequent concurring opinion, gave oft-repeated criti-
cism of the hybrid rights exception:
[T]he distinction Smith draws strikes me as ultimately untenable. If a hy-
brid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is impli-
cated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow
the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover the situa-
tion exemplified by Smith .... But if a hybrid claim is one in which a
litigant would actually obtain an exemption from a formally neutral,
generally applicable law under another constitutional provision, then
there would have been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the
hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.
182
Most of the circuits have echoed Justice Souter's complaints and have
struggled with fleshing out a workable hybrid rights exception.1
83
Three possible theories have arisen in the lower courts of how to apply
the hybrid rights exception: (1) the independently-viable rights theory, (2)
the implication theory, and (3) the colorable claim theory.184 The inde-
pendently-viable rights theory requires that the adjoining constitutional
claim be independently viable in its own right. 185 Using this theory, how-
ever, the hybrid rights exception would be moot because if the individual is
already protected by an independent constitutional claim, there is no need
for the free exercise claim.186
The second theory, the implication theory, requires that the govern-
mental action merely implicate a second constitutional claim, basically
meaning that the second claim be nonfrivolous. 18 7 This theory, however,
181. See, e.g., Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a "Rule" Doesn't Rule: The Failure of the
Oregon Employment Division v. Smith "Hybrid Rights Exception," 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 573 (2003)
(criticizing the hybrid rights exception),
182. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
183. See William L_ Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus or
Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 211 (1998) (examining how lower courts have
interpreted and applied the hybrid fights exception); Timothy J. Santoli, Note, A Decade After Em-
ployment Division v. Smith: Examining How Courts are Still Grappling with the Hybrid-Rights Excep-
tion to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 34 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 649, 668 (2001)
(examining how courts are dealing with the exception).
184. Santoli, supra note 183, at 669-70.





swallows up the Smith rule. 188 Virtually any free exercise claim could be
joined with another nonfrivolous constitutional claim, thus requiring the
compelling interest test to be applied in almost every case. Under this the-
ory, the three-sentence exception from Smith would devour the entire Smith
opinion.
The third theory, the colorable claim theory, requires that the plaintiff
show a companion constitutional claim that is "colorable," usually defined
as requiring the plaintiff to show a fair likelihood of success on the mer-
its. 189 This seems to be the most sensible theory; it neither swallows the
Smith rule nor makes the exception meaningless. Unsurprisingly, the color-
able claim theory is the theory that most of the circuits have adopted, in-
cluding the Tenth Circuit. 190
Although requiring a colorable claim makes sense in theory, in prac-
tice, the colorable claim theory often resembles the independent-viable
theory. Lower courts that have used the colorable claim theory show that
the result often turns on whether the independent constitutional claim can
stand on its own. 191 If the independent constitutional claim fails, then the
hybrid rights exception fails as well. 192 Alternatively, if the independent
constitutional claim succeeds, then the court usually bases its holding on
that claim and merely adds the hybrid rights exception for extra support. 193
On examination, lower courts' propensity to treat the colorable claim
theory just like the independent-viable theory makes sense. It is difficult for
a court to analyze a constitutional claim only halfway. Hence, if a court has
all the necessary facts, it will simply decide whether there is a successful
claim, but it will couch it in terms of whether the claim is "likely" to
succeed.
Axson-Flynn provides a good example of what happens when courts
apply the colorable claim theory. In Axson-Flynn, the Tenth Circuit dis-
cussed the various ways it could apply the hybrid rights exception and
found that the colorable claim theory was the sensible middle ground. 194
However, the court did not decide the hybrid rights claim because it re-
188. Id.
189. Id. at 669 70.
190. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1295 (10th Cir. 2004).
191. See, e.g., Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Scb. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 699-700 (10th Cir.
1998) (applying the colorable theory to dismiss a hybrid claim); see also Gregory C. Sisk, Michael
Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of
Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491, 570 (2004); Esser, supra note 183, at 242-43.
192. Esser, supra note 183, at 242-43.
193. Id.
194. 356 F.3dat 1295-97.
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manded Axson-Flynn's free speech claim for further fact development. 195
Thus, the Tenth Circuit first needed to know whether the free speech claim
likely would be successful in its own right before it could determine
whether the hybrid rights exception would be available. 196 Had the Tenth
Circuit eventually found that the free speech claim successful in its own
right, it appears that any further hybrid rights exception discussion would
be purely icing on the cake.
Because in practice courts tend to apply the hybrid rights exception as
if it were the independent-viable theory, there is little hope that the hybrid
rights exception will provide a safe haven against compelled swearing.
Even if the Supreme Court validates the exception, its application in the
lower courts suggests the need for joining an independent constitutional
claim. 19
7
B. Smith's Individualized-Exemptions Exception
The second exception from Smith is the individualized-exemptions
exception. Unlike the hybrid rights exception, the Supreme Court has reaf-
firmed this exception after Smith. 198 The Court explained this exception by
stating that "in circumstances in which individualized exemptions from a
general requirement are available, the government may not refuse to extend
that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason." 199
Hence, when systems provide for individualized exemptions,200 the state
must show a compelling state interest before it can infringe on an individ-
ual's free exercise rights.
Requiring a state to show a compelling state interest would clearly be
sufficient to prevent a state from compelling an individual to swear. The
argument that Smith's individualized exemption exception will suffice to
prevent the undesired result finds some support in Axson-Flynn. The Tenth
195. Id. at 1297.
196. Id.
197. The obvious question arises as to whether there is an independent constitutional claim that
would protect against being compelled to swear. This is in fact one of the arguments addressed below
and so will not be addressed here.
198. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537 (1993).
199. Id. (quoting Employment Div- v- Smith, 494 U.S. 882, 884 (1990)).
200. Courts have disagreed on exactly what constitutes a system of individualized exemptions.
Some courts hold that the exception is limited to systems that are designed to make case-by-case deter-
minations. Other courts hold that the exception includes statutes that contain exceptions for objectively
defined categories of persons. For this Note's purposes, the analysis is not affected by how a court
defines a system of individualized exemptions. See Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil Is in the Details:
Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1062, 1081-
83 (2000) (discussing how courts have applied the exception).
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Circuit determined in Axson-Flynn that there was a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact as to whether the University of Utah maintained a discretionary
system of case-by-case exemptions from the acting program require-
ments. 201 Because the ATP instructor had allowed other people to miss
assignments without penalty, the Tenth Circuit held that this might qualify
as a system of individualized exemptions that would require the ATP to
show a compelling interest in refusing to extend those same exemptions to
Axson-Flynn. 202 Hence, the individualized exemption exception played a
large part in preventing the Tenth Circuit from outright affirming the dis-
trict court's decision that the ATP could compel Axson-Flynn to swear.
The individualized-exemptions exception, however, relies too much
on the constitutional good luck of a government entity having a system of
individualized exemptions in place to sufficiently protect against compelled
swearing. Further, not only is the exception available solely when such a
system is present, it is the governmental entity that will determine what
kind of system it will have. Accordingly, any protection that the exception
gives to religious conduct relies exclusively on the government. If the gov-
ernment does not create a system of individualized exemptions, the excep-
tion is wholly unavailable. Clearly an exception that gives the government
the key to its use cannot be relied on to give adequate protection against
govemment-compelled swearing.
Admittedly, because some governmental entities may need a system
of individualized exemptions to meet their purposes, not all governmental
entities will have the luxury of simply choosing not to have such a system:
However, even with the acknowledgment that the government will not
always be able to simply avoid having a system of individualized exemp-
tions, the exception is also inadequate because it relies on a form of consti-
tutional good luck.203 The result turns not on balancing the importance of
the religious conduct with the importance of the government's interest, but
on whether there is the good fortune of having another individual who suc-
cessfully obtains an exemption. Moreover, the same exact statute in two
different states could have differing free exercise standards for the same
exact religious conduct. Relying on good luck to determine whether the
Free Exercise Clause will protect similarly situated plaintiffs is illogical
and fundamentally unfair.
201. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1299 (10th Cir. 2004).
202. Id. at 1298-99.
203. See Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck: The General Applicability Re-
quirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 627 (2003) (arguing that the
individualized exemption exception relies on the good fortune of having secular exceptions available).
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Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge v. City of Newark provides a
good illustration.204 In Fraternal Order, the Third Circuit held that a policy
requiring police officers to be clean-shaven violated the Free Exercise
Clause, because it exempted officers who could not shave for medical rea-
sons but did not extend that same exemption to officers who could not
shave for religious reasons. 205 The plaintiff in that case was fortunate that
there were officers on the force who could not shave for medical reasons.
Had there been no such officers with that particular medical condition on
the force, the plaintiff would have been constitutionally out of luck.
Axson-Flynn's situation provides another example. It was providential
for Axson-Flynn that the instructor had exempted a Jewish student from
class assignments. Had the Jewish student not been in the class, there
would have been no exemptions from the class assignments and thus no
exception available for Axson-Flynn. However, even with the Jewish stu-
dent, this is a case where the governmental entity easily held the key to the
exception. The ATP's downfall was that it provided individualized exemp-
tions from its course curriculum. If the ATP had refused the Jewish stu-
dent's request for an exemption, even providence would not have saved
Axson-Flynn. The key to the exception was solely in the ATP's hands:
simply follow its own policy on class assignments and the individualized-
exemption exception would not have been available.
These examples illustrate an inherent limit to the individualized ex-
emption exception. The exception can never fully protect against com-
pelled swearing because it relies on the good fortune of governmental
entity exceptions. The individualized-exemption exception simply does not
provide any protection against a governmental law or entity that provides
no exemptions. As a result, it cannot bear the needed burden of protecting
someone from being compelled to swear.
C. Using Other Constitutional Provisions Such as Free Speech to
Prevent Compelled Swearing
The first two arguments in Part IV have tested this Note's thesis that
Smith must be overruled or reinterpreted to prevent compelled swearing. As
discussed above, the two exceptions from Smith are inadequate. Part IV
will now examine three non-Smith based arguments that Smith need not be
overruled or reinterpreted to protect adequately against compelled
swearing.
204. 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
205. Id. at 360.
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The first of these arguments advocates using some other constitutional
provision besides the Free Exercise Clause to protect against compelled
swearing. If one could locate a constitutional provision that would inde-
pendently protect an individual from being compelled to swear, there
would be no need to criticize Smith for not preventing that result. Of
course, because swearing is an obvious form of speech, the natural consti-
tutional candidate is the Free Speech Clause. The Supreme Court has re-
peatedly recognized that the Free Speech Clause protects not only the right
to speak, but also the right to refrain from speaking. 206 Hence, the Free
Speech Clause seems the ideal independent constitutional provision to use
to protect against what the Free Exercise Clause does not. This seems espe-
cially true when one considers that even before Smith, the Free Speech
Clause provided much greater protection than the Free Exercise Clause.
207
Thus, the argument is that because swearing is a form of speech, the Free
Speech Clause will act as an adequate safeguard against compelled
swearing.
However, using another constitutional provision such as the Free
Speech Clause to protect against compelled swearing is unlikely to work,
and in any case, hurts free exercise rights by deemphasizing their impor-
tance. The Axson-Flynn case itself shows the practical problem that the
Free Speech Clause may not provide the needed protection because Axson-
Flynn in fact made both a free speech claim and a free exercise claim. 208 In
analyzing Axson-Flynn's free speech claim, the Tenth Circuit applied the
Supreme Court's free speech standard20 9 from Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier.2 10 In Hazelwood, the Court emphasized that although stu-
dents' free speech rights are not shed at the school doors, they are also not
coextensive with free speech rights in other contexts. 2 11 Although Hazel-
wood dealt with a high school setting, the Tenth Circuit held that the same
standard should apply to the university setting.2 12 The Tenth Circuit also
206. See supra note 174.
207. See Patrick M. Garry, Inequality Among Equals: Disparities in the Judicial Treatment of Free
Speech and Religious Exercise Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 361 (2004) (detailing how greater
protection has been given to free speech rights than to free exercise rights).
208. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2004).
209. This Note will not go into a detailed analysis of the Free Speech Clause, but will merely touch
on some relevant factors. Going into an in-depth free speech analysis is not necessary for this Note
because the second reason for not using free speech rights to protect free exercise would apply regard-
less of how much protection free speech would give. For a more detailed analysis of free speech rights
in the university context, see Thomas J. Davis, Note, Assessing Constitutional Challenges to University
Free Speech Zones Under Public Forum Doctrine, 79 IND- L.J. 267 (2004).
210. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289.
211. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988).
212. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289.
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found that the type of speech involved in Axson-Flynn should be catego-
rized as school-sponsored speech. 213 Accordingly, the school could place
restrictions on speech as long as its actions were reasonably related to le-
gitimate pedagogical concerns.
214
Although the Tenth Circuit did not dispute that the ATP's stated rea-
sons 215 for its policy of requiring students to perform the scripts as written
were reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns, the court did
find that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the ATP's peda-
gogical concerns were pretextual. 216 If the ATP's reasons were pretextual,
then the ATP's actions almost certainly violated Axson-Flynn's free speech
rights. The Tenth Circuit consequently remanded Axson-Flynn's free
speech claim to the lower court so it could determine whether the ATP's
reasons for the script adherence requirement were truly pedagogical or
merely a pretext for religious discrimination.217
Despite Axson-Flynn's victory in having her free speech claim re-
manded, it was clear from the court's opinion that if the ATP's justifica-
tions for requiring Axson-Flynn to swear were not pretextual, the Free
Speech Clause would not protect Axson-Flynn from being compelled to
swear. 2 18 Therefore, the Free Speech Clause would not likely prevent
someone from being compelled to swear in the school context.
219
Even if the Tenth Circuit incorrectly applied free speech jurisprudence
in Axson-Flynn and the Free Speech Clause could successfully prevent
someone from being compelled to swear, the second argument against us-
ing the Free Speech Clause or other constitutional provisions for protection
would still apply: by abandoning the Free Exercise Clause for other consti-
tutional provisions, free exercise rights are further deteriorated and deval-
ued. The Free Exercise Clause would likely be harmed by using the Free
213. Id. at 1290.
214. Id. (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273).
215. The ATP leaders argued that requiring students to perform offensive scripts advanced the
school's pedagogical interest in at least three ways:
(1) it teaches students how to step outside their own values and character by forcing them to
assume a very foreign character and to recite offensive dialogue; (2) it teaches students to pre-
serve the integrity of the author's work, and (3) it measures true acting skills to be able con-
vincingly to portray an offensive part.
Id. at 1291.
216. Id. at 1293.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1290.
219. The Free Speech Clause likely would prevent a state from compelling someone to swear
outside of the school context. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that the Free
Speech Clause prohibits a state from requiring someone to carry a license plate with the state motto on
it because it forced the person to speak the state's message). However, even if free speech would usu-
ally be sufficient protection, the second reason for not using the Free Speech Clause would still apply.
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Speech Clause or other constitutional provisions for protection in three
ways: (1) if potential free exercise cases are increasingly protected under
other constitutional provisions, courts would likely afford less protection to
the Free Exercise Clause and consequently, religious conduct that is not
protected by other constitutional provisions would become more vulner-
able; (2) using other constitutional provisions to protect religious conduct
decreases the recognition that free exercise values deserve to have in their
own right; and (3) using free speech protection may endanger religious
accommodation from government.
As intimated earlier, the history of free exercise shows that there is a
large overlap in conduct that can be categorized both as speech and free
exercise. 220 Over time, the Free Speech Clause has broadened to include
many things that one does not readily imagine to be "speech. '221 This
broadening has included conduct that can be categorized as symbolic
speech and many types of religious conduct. 222 However, the overlapping
spheres are not coterminous. Some religious conduct will not fit into free
speech or other constitutional provisions.
223
Like the muscle in one's body, the Free Exercise Clause may lose
some of its strength if it is infrequently used. If a court believes that reli-
gious conduct is well protected through other constitutional provisions, it
may be less likely to infuse the Free Exercise Clause with independent
strength of its own. Without a vigorous enforcement of the Free Exercise
Clause, religious conduct that is not protected under other constitutional
provisions may be vulnerable to dwindling constitutional protection.
Additionally, by using the Free Speech Clause or other constitutional
provisions to protect free exercise, free exercise rights are deprived of the
recognition that religious activities are deserving of protection in their own
right. 224 Continually characterizing religious activities as simply a subset of
speech generally diminishes the uniqueness and distinctiveness of religion
220. See, e.g., Wooley, 430 U.S. 705 (refusal to have license plate with state motto could fall within
both the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Clause); W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319
U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (requirement to repeat the pledge of allegiance involved both free speech and free
exercise).
221. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (nude dancing considered speech);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405406 (1989) (burning the flag considered speech); Wooley, 430 U.S.
705 (holding that free speech protects against state requirement to use license plate with state motto).
222. See Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech
Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 121-23 (2002) (examining overlaps between free
speech and free exercise).
223. Evidently, Smith itself was a case of this because the Court failed to recognize a free
speech/free exercise hybrid claim in that case. See McConnell, supra note 8, at 1122.
224. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993) (arguing that the law and society trivializes religious belief).
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as a value worthy of constitutional protection. 225 Although many in today's
modem society would argue that religion should not be given preferential
protection,226 the fact remains that the Constitution has expressly set apart
religious beliefs and activities as something worthy of protection. Although
society's mores may be trending away from giving preferential treatment to
religious activities, the judiciary must still engage the Constitution as it is
written.227 The answer for those who disagree with the Constitution's pref-
erential treatment of religion is to amend the Constitution, not to deplete
the Free Exercise Clause of any substantive protections.
Finally, using the Free Speech Clause to protect religious activity may
endanger some of the accommodations and exemptions made for religion
by government. 228 As Justice Scalia pointed out in Smith, the government
is often solicitous of religious values and frequently provides legislative
accommodations that apply only to religious activities.229 Indeed, Justice
Scalia not only pointed out these government accommodations but offered
their existence as the primary comfort to those religious individuals con-
cerned with the Court's decision. 230 However, using the Free Speech
Clause to protect religious exercise may endanger exactly the comfort that
the Smith Court promised: government accommodation. 2 31
Under free speech jurisprudence, if a viewpoint is given favorable
treatment over other viewpoints, this constitutes viewpoint discrimination
and is subject to strict scrutiny.232 If religious activities are increasingly
characterized as expression for purposes of free speech protection, it be-
comes difficult to avoid the conclusion that the government's preferential
accommodations to religion constitute viewpoint discrimination and conse-
quently should be subject to strict scrutiny analysis.233 Most government
accommodations will not survive strict scrutiny analysis. Accordingly, the
225. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 284 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (recognizing that if
religious worship was not any different from normal speech, "the Religion Clauses would be emptied of
any independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice took the form of speech").
226. See Gedicks, supra note 15, at 927. Of course, people may debate over the meaning of religion
in the Constitution, but whatever its meaning, the Constitution clearly sets religion apart for protection.
227. See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 314
(1996) ("For whatever reason, the Constitution does give special protection to liberty in the domain of
religion, and we cannot repudiate that decision without rejecting an essential feature of constitutional-
ism, rendering all constitutional rights vulnerable to repudiation if they go out of favor.").
228. Brownstein, supra note 222, at 164-69.
229. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). Smith itself provides an example of this
because Oregon subsequently changed its laws to exempt those who use peyote as part of a religious
ceremony.
230. Id.
231. Brownstein, supra note 222, at 164-69.
232. Id. at 164-65.
233. Id. at 166.
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last refuge of Smith, government grace, is endangered by relying too much
on the Free Speech Clause for protection of free exercise rights.
As the above arguments show, serious problems, both practical and
otherwise, exist with adopting a strategy of using the Free Speech Clause or
other constitutional provisions to protect free exercise rights. Hence, even
if one could use free speech or some other constitutional provision to pre-
vent compelled swearing, it would be unwise to do so. For those reasons,
the Free Exercise Clause must stand or fall on its own in preventing the
undesired result.
D. Finding a Criminal/Noncriminal Distinction in Smith
Another possible argument that Smith does not need to be modified or
overruled to prevent compelled swearing is that Smith was only meant to
apply in the criminal context. The Smith opinion was decided in the context
of whether the Free Exercise Clause exempted someone from a state crimi-
nal statute. Arguably, society's interest is at its highest when it is enforcing
its criminal prohibitions. Criminal laws are designed to protect society from
harmful individuals and exempting someone from a criminal law is a much
different matter than exempting someone from a school assignment. An
argument can be made then that the Smith decision may be confined to the
criminal context.
One can safely assume that a state would not make it a crime to refuse
to swear. The plausible place for the state to compel swearing is a situation
similar to Axson-Flynn, when government policy is involved rather than an
actual criminal law. Hence, the argument is that confining Smith to the
criminal context should be sufficient to prevent someone from being com-
pelled to swear.
However, the Smith decision's language and reasoning reject confin-
ing its holding to the criminal context and to do so would be counterintui-
tive. The argument that Smith should be confined to the criminal context is
inadequate for a number of reasons. 234 The principal reason for not confin-
ing Smith to the criminal context is that the Smith opinion itself seems to
foreclose this possibility. Although the opinion makes clear that the Court
is aware that the law at issue is a criminal prohibition, 235 the Court's lan-
guage does not indicate that the Court would accept confining Smith to the
234. Many of the arguments from this section come from the Third Circuit decisions in Fraternal
Order of Police Newark Lodge v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999) and Salvation Army v.
Dept. of Cmty. Affairs of N.J., 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990).
235. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (declining to apply Sherbert in the context of a generally applicable
criminal law).
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criminal context. The Smith Court repeatedly used language that encom-
passed criminal as well as noncriminal regulations. 236 Further, the Court
had to distinguish past precedents involving noncriminal statutes, but in
distinguishing these cases, the Court gave no indication of a crimi-
nal/noncriminal distinction. 237 Had the Court intended Smith to apply only
to the criminal context, it could have simply distinguished these cases on
the basis that they involved noncriminal statutes. Instead, the Court found
other ways to distinguish these cases that required much more creativity
than simply using a criminal/noncriminal dichotomy.
In addition to the Smith Court's language and precedent, it would be
counterintuitive to interpret Smith as holding that the Free Exercise Clause
applies only when criminal laws are involved but not when civil laws or
government policies are concerned. 238 This is because a religious person
faces much higher burdens when faced with breaking a criminal law as
opposed to a civil law or governmental policy. 239 A religious person who
violates a criminal law faces such high burdens as the loss of his liberty or
the stigma of being branded a criminal, whereas these high burdens are not
present when one violates a civil statute. It would be odd to hold that the
Free Exercise Clause offers protection only when the burdens on the reli-
gious individual are low but not when the burdens are at their highest.
Smith itself repudiates this logic when the Court states that "if a State has
prohibited through its criminal laws certain kinds of religiously motivated
conduct without violating the First Amendment, it certainly follows that it
may impose the lesser burden of denying unemployment compensation
benefits to persons who engage in that conduct. '240
Finally, the Supreme Court has had other opportunities since Smith to
introduce a criminal/noncriminal distinction, but the Court has refused to
do so. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the law at issue was a noncriminal land-
236. Such language includes "[olur most recent decision involving a neutral, generally applicable
regulatory law that compelled activity forbidden by an individual's religion," id. at 880; "[tihe only
decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone," id. at
881; "[t]he government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful con-
duct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, cannot depend on measuring the effects
of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development," id. at 885 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
237. Some of these noncriminal cases included United States v, Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (social
security payroll taxes); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (compulsory attendance laws); and
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (compelled display of license plate slogans).
238. See Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d at 363-64 (making the argument that the distinction
would be counterintuitive).
239. Id.
240. Smith, 494 U.S. at 875 (emphasis added) (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human Re-
sources of Or. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670 (1988)).
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mark ordinance. 24 1 The Supreme Court had to determine whether the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), which attempted to restore the
compelling interest test to the free exercise area, was consistent with
Smith.242 If the Court intended a criminal/noncriminal distinction in Smith,
there would have been no need to even discuss Smith because the ordinance
at issue was noncriminal. However, not only did the Court discuss Smith,
but it struck down the RFRA as being inconsistent with Smith.
24 3
The majority of circuits that have faced the issue have agreed that the
Supreme Court never intended Smith to be confined to the criminal con-
text. 244 Moreover, because the Supreme Court made it clear in Smith and
subsequent opinions that Smith should not be confined to the criminal con-
text, it is extremely unlikely that one could successfully use this distinction
to prevent someone from being compelled to swear.
E. Finding a Compelled/Prohibited Distinction in Smith
The final argument that Smith does not need to be modified or over-
ruled to prevent compelled swearing is that Smith should not apply when
someone is being compelled to do something, rather than merely prohib-
ited. In Smith, the plaintiff was being prohibited from ingesting peyote,
while in Axson-Flynn, the plaintiff was being compelled to swear. In the
first case, the individual was being prohibited from performing a religious
requirement, while in the latter case, the individual was being compelled to
take action that she considered to be a sin. One may argue that there is a
fundamental distinction between merely prohibiting someone from taking
action and compelling someone to perform an action that is offensive to
them.245 While prohibiting someone from doing something limits the range
of actions that person may take, compelling someone to do something actu-
241. 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997).
242. Id.
243. ld. at 536.
244. See Littlefield v. Fomey Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 292-94 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying the
Smith standard to school uniform policy); Iskcon of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 953 (D.C.
Cir. 199 5 ) (applying Smith standard to National Park Service regulations); Sherman v. Comty. Consol.
Sch. Dist. 21 of Wheeling Township, 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying Smith standard to
state statute requiring recitation of the pledge of allegiance); Vandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ.,
925 F.2d 927, 932 (6th Cir. 1991) (agreeing with other circuits that Smith standard is not limited to
criminal context); Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 195-96 (holding that Smith standard applies to the policy
of police department, rejecting plaintiffs argument that Smith standard only applies to criminal prohibi-
tions).
245. In fact, Reynolds distinguished past preedent on this very distinction. The Court in Reynolds
pointed to an English case where the parents of a sick child refused to call for medical help because of
their religious beliefs but were found not guilty of manslaughter. The Court stated that if the parents had
taken the positive act of starving their children because of religious beliefs, then it would have been an
entirely different scenario. 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
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ally forces them to take a single action. While both infringe on the liberty
of the person, the latter creates a form of involuntary servitude in that they
are forced to do something with their own body that they do not want to do.
Therefore, one can argue that because compelling action is more offensive
than prohibiting action, Smith should be confined to cases where action is
being prohibited rather than compelled. Clearly, this would prevent com-
pelled swearing.
1. Smith's language and reasoning reject finding a distinction between
compelled action and prohibited action.
Similar to the criminal/noncriminal distinction, both Supreme Court
precedent and practical problems stand in the way of finding a prohib-
ited/compelled distinction. Once again, Smith itself seems to reject any type
of distinction between compelled and prohibited conduct. The Smith
Court's reasoning focused heavily on distinguishing between religious
belief and religious action. 246 The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause
protects primarily the former and not the latter.247 Because compelling
conduct and prohibiting conduct both deal with religious action, the Court's
reasoning does not support finding a distinction between the two. In both
instances, it is conduct being regulated, not belief. Thus, the Smith Court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that "requiring any individual to observe a
generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an
act that his religious beliefforbids (or requires)" violates free exercise.
24 8
Another argument rejected by the Smith Court was that the compelling
interest test could be limited to conduct that was "central" to the individ-
ual's religious beliefs. 249 The Court emphatically rejected this argument on
the basis that courts should not be involved in determining what religious
beliefs are "central" anymore than they should be involved in deciding
what ideas are "important" in the free speech field.250 The centrality argu-
ment offered by the plaintiffs essentially posits that central religious beliefs
should have a higher level of protection because infringement on "central"
beliefs constitutes a higher burden on the religious individual. The com-
pelled/prohibited distinction similarly rests on the notion that religious
individuals should be protected from burdens that are particularly heavy.
Because the Smith Court was not persuaded to accept the higher burden
246. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
247. Id. at 877-78.
248. Id. at 878 (emphasis added).
249. Id. at 886-87.
250. Id.
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argument inherent in the centrality argument, the Supreme Court also likely
would not accept the higher burden argument contained in the com-
pelled/prohibited distinction.
Consistent with the Smith Court's reasoning, the Court interpreted past
Supreme Court decisions in a way that also rejects any basis for distin-
guishing between compelled action and prohibited action. The Smith Court
stated that "[s]ubsequent decisions have consistently held that the right of
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with
a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law
proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or pro-
scribes).'"251 The Court then cited past opinions that included cases in
which the plaintiff was compelled to perform conduct that was against his
religious belief.
252
Additionally, although the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed
an argument after Smith that Smith should be confined to prohibited con-
duct, the Court has expressly addressed a compelled/prohibited distinction
in the free speech area.253 If one can argue that it is more offensive for a
state to compel someone to do a specific act rather than simply prohibiting
someone from acting, one should also be able to argue that it is also more
offensive for a state to force someone to speak a specific message rather
than merely prohibiting a person from speaking. However, despite the fact
that the reasoning behind recognizing a compelled/prohibited distinction
would seemingly apply to the free speech area as well, the Supreme Court
has consistently refused to recognize any distinction between the two. The
Court has held in its free speech jurisprudence that although "[t]here is
certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled si-
lence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference is without con-
stitutional significance.
'254
Lower court rulings also have been consistent with the argument that
the Smith decision is not limited to prohibiting conduct. Although none of
the circuits have expressly faced an argument for recognizing a com-
pelled/prohibited distinction, circuit courts have faced religious individuals
being compelled to do something against their religious beliefs, and none
have had any hesitation in applying Smith. For example, in Kissinger v.
Board of Trustees of the Ohio State University, College of Veterinary
251. Id. at 879 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
252. Id at 879-80 For example, two of the cases the Court cites are Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd, of
Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940) (student compelled to say pledge of allegiance) and United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Amish compelled to collect social security taxes).
253. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1988).
254. Id.
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Medicine, the plaintiff was enrolled in Ohio State's veterinary college and
refused to operate on live animals because it was against her religious be-
liefs. 255 The Sixth Circuit had no difficulty applying Smith and holding that
the Free Exercise Clause did not prevent the school from requiring the
plaintiff to operate on live animals in order to graduate. 256 Other circuit
courts have held similarly.257
2. The distinction between compelled and prohibited action is not always
clear-cut and would be difficult to apply.
Even if the Supreme Court wanted to recognize a com-
pelled/prohibited distinction, the distinction often would be difficult to
apply. Activities can often be characterized as either an act of omission or
commission. For example, one Third Circuit case dealt with a plaintiff who
refused to shave as required by police department policy.258 The policy
could be characterized as a prohibition against beards, or it could be char-
acterized as a requirement to shave. Another example can be seen from a
Ninth Circuit case in which a Quaker organization refused to follow a fed-
eral law that prohibited an employer from hiring or continuing to employ
an unauthorized alien. 259 This law violated the Quakers' religious beliefs,
which required them to "welcome. . . the sojourner, the stranger, the poor,
and the dispossessed in their midst. '260 The law could be characterized as
simply prohibiting the Quaker organization from hiring illegal aliens, or it
could be characterized as requiring the Quaker organization to "turn away"
illegal aliens or fire them if they are currently employed. Even in the Ax-
son-Flynn case, one could make an argument that the school's policy is
simply a prescription against altering the assigned scripts rather than a re-
quirement to compel swearing.
As these examples show, the practical difficulty in the prohib-
ited/compelled distinction is that even prohibitions often require affirma-
tive action to comply. One solution may be to characterize the law or
policy based on how the law or policy is worded, but surely free exercise
protection should not turn on how the policy happens to be worded. Al-
255. 5 F.3d 177, 178 (6th Cir. 1993).
256. Id at 179-
257. See. e.g., Ryan v- United States Dep't of Justice, 950 F.2d 458, 461 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding
that free exercise did not prevent FBI from requiring FBI agent to investigate matters that violated his
religious beliefs).
258. Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 360-61 (3d Cir.
1999).




though the prohibited/compelled distinction makes sense in theory, its ap-
plication would show that the distinction might prove to be a slippery con-
cept with seemingly random and unequal results.
3. A compelled/prohibited distinction likely is not a meaningful distinc-
tion to the religious individual.
Even if courts could overcome the practical difficulties in applying the
compelled/prohibited distinction, it still may be a distinction without a
difference to the religious individual. The argument for the com-
pelled/prohibited distinction assumes that it is more offensive for a reli-
gious individual to be compelled to do something religiously forbidden to
him than merely prohibiting him from doing something that is religiously
required. This assumption, however, is not necessarily tenable. Whether a
religious individual is being compelled to perform a sin of omission or a sin
of commission, either way, he is being compelled to sin.
For example, if a religious individual believes that baptism is a pre-
requisite to salvation,2 61 would it really be less offensive to him merely to
be prohibited from being baptized rather than to be compelled to do some-
thing that is prohibited by his religious belief? The answer does not lie in
the compelled/prohibited distinction, but in what type of religious burden is
put on the individual. For someone who believes that baptism is essential
for salvation, prohibiting baptism would place an extremely high burden on
that individual. However, if the person were merely prohibited from doing
something that was not essential to his salvation, such as having a public
prayer at school graduation, the burden would not be as heavy.
The same can be said for compelled conduct. Although using profan-
ity of any kind was against Axson-Flynn's religious belief, she was willing
to use some profane words such as "damn" and "shit" 262 because using
them was not as serious a religious violation as was using God's name in a
profane way. Hence, in addition to the fact that the Supreme Court has
already seemingly rejected the compelled/prohibited distinction and is not
likely to change its mind, the distinction would also be difficult to apply
and in any case is not one that would assist much in protecting an individ-
ual's free exercise rights when protection is important. Thus, the com-
pelled/prohibited distinction cannot be relied on to prevent someone from
being compelled to swear.
261. Many Christian religions interpret John 3:5 as a strict requirement for baptism as a prerequisite
to salvation. John 3:5 states that "[e]xcept a man be born of water and of the spirit, he cannot enter into
the kingdom of God." (King James).
262. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1272, 1281 n.2 (10th Cir. 2004).
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CONCLUSION
When one understands the Smith Court's theoretical view of the Free
Exercise Clause, it becomes clear that under Smith, a state may constitu-
tionally compel someone to swear in violation of his religious beliefs. The
Court's ultimate concern in Smith appears to be twofold: (1) the difficulty
in defining and limiting the term "religion" in today's pluralistic society,
and (2) the belief that courts have no business determining the significance
of an individual's religious beliefs. For the Smith Court, these two concerns
appear to lead to the conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause must protect
everything or it must protect virtually nothing. As a result, the Court per-
ceives its only available options are to leave free exercise protection to the
political process or to allow a "system in which each conscience is a law
unto itself.
'263
If one accepts the Court's assumption that these are the only two vi-
able options, then admittedly, the Court has a stronger argument. But surely
the Free Exercise Clause cannot be summarily dismissed as too difficult to
apply and thus should not be applied at all. The Constitution does not give
the judiciary the option of simply refusing to interpret its provisions. The
First Amendment dictates that free exercise of "religion" must be pro-
tected.264 Accordingly, the Constitution compels the Court to struggle with
the contours of what constitutes "religion." There is no constitutional opt-
out provision for constitutional words that are difficult to apply.
Nor does the Constitution give the Court the option of simply ignoring
constitutional mandates. A large area of middle ground exists between the
Court's two opposing alternatives for free exercise jurisprudence. Unfortu-
nately, this middle ground requires the Court to tackle difficult issues such
as defining religion and possibly evaluating the significance of a religious
belief against the importance of a specific law. The Court describes the
results of choosing this middle ground where "federal judges will regularly
balance against the importance of general laws the significance of religious
practice," and then dismisses it as a "parade of horribles" that is too "horri-
ble to contemplate. '"265
It is not clear whom the Court feels would be most hurt by this "pa-
rade of horribles." Surely not religious individuals; they would undoubt-
edly prefer their religious beliefs to be probed for sincerity and significance
rather than acquiesce to the Court's approach of simply refusing to grant
263. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
264. See supra note 227.
265. Smith, 494 U.S. at 889 n.5.
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any constitutional significance to their beliefs at all. If the Court is con-
cerned about requiring lawmakers at times constitutionally to exempt reli-
gious individuals from statutory provisions, its concern is misplaced. It is
the lawmakers who have sought to prevent the Court from dismantling the
Free Exercise Clause through such legislation as the RFRA, and in any
case, the Court certainly should not be overly concerned about hurting leg-
islatures' feelings by requiring their laws to conform to constitutional dic-
tates. Perhaps the Court is concerned about putting such a burden on
judges. If so, it would truly be odd to say that requiring the judiciary to
perform its appointed role as constitutional interpreters is a burden no judge
should be expected to fulfill.
To be sure, finding a balance in interpreting the Free Exercise Clause
is difficult and will increase the discretion of judges; however, as one free
exercise scholar has put it, "when the Constitution imposes limits on gov-
ernmental power, interpretation of those limits in marginal cases is-to
borrow some of the Smith Court's words-the 'unavoidable consequence'
of constitutionalism." 266
This Note has critiqued Smith by examining one adverse consequence
of the Court's Smith decision: that a state may constitutionally compel a
religious individual to swear. This consequence affirms the criticism of
Smith that Smith inappropriately left free exercise protection primarily to
the political process. In doing so, Smith left free exercise rights vulnerable
in two ways: (1) the Free Exercise Clause no longer sufficiently protects
free exercise rights that conflict with changing societal norms and majori-
tarian interests, and (2) even where free exercise rights are protected by
societal norms, these rights are still vulnerable where there are governmen-
tal actors who choose not to follow those norms. Axson-Flynn provides a
case where both of these vulnerabilities were arguably present. Axson-
Flynn's protection against being compelled to swear from societal norms
had been deteriorated by the weakening of society's swearing taboo, and
even though most people would still hesitate to require someone to swear,
Axson-Flynn was faced with a state university who did not share those
hesitations. Consequently, Axson-Flynn affirms the criticisms of Smith.
Notably, this Note has primarily been a critique of Smith and is not an
offered plan for what should replace Smith. Although other articles argue
over the appropriate free exercise standard,267 this Note's primary focus
266- McConnell, supra note 8, at 1153.
267. See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, The Free Exercise of Religion After the Fall: The Case for
Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 925 (1998) (arguing that Smith should be revisited and
replaced with an intermediate scrutiny standard for the Free Exercise Clause)-
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has been on showing that the Smith standard does not adequately protect
against compelled swelling. However, almost any kind of standard with
heightened scrutiny would better serve the Free Exercise Clause than the
Smith standard. Although the Free Exercise Clause before Smith never
actually gave the level of protection it purported to, the heightened protec-
tion it did give was more than enough to prevent a state from compelling
someone to swear. Hence, a return to the pre-Smith standard should amelio-
rate the adverse consequence that Smith has produced. In any case, unless
Smith is reinterpreted or overruled, there remains no constitutional way to
prevent a state entity from compelling a religious individual to swear in
violation of his or her beliefs. Smith repudiendus est.
268
269. Latin for "Smith must be overnuled" Brownstein, supra note 222,213 n .310.
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